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Abstract: Traditional studies have shown that the moral judgments are 
influenced by many biasing factors, like the consequences of a behavior, 
certain characteristics of the agent who commits the act, or the words 
chosen to describe the behavior. In the present study we investigated a 
new factor that could bias the evaluation of morally relevant human 
behavior: the perceived similarity between the participants and the 
agent described in the moral scenario. The participants read a story 
about a driver who illegally overtook another car and hit a pedestrian 
who was crossing the street. The latter was taken to the hospital with a 
broken leg. The driver was described either as being similar to the 
participant (a student, 21 years old, the same gender as the participant) 
or dissimilar (a retired person, 69 years old, different gender as the 
participant). The results show that the participants from the increased 
similarity group expressed more lenient evaluations of the immorality of 
the driver’s behavior compared to the participants from the decreased 
similarity group. The results are discussed within a framework which 
puts emphasis on motivational and protective reasons. 
Keywords: moral judgments, moral appraisals, moral bias, defensive 
attribution theory, perceived similarity. 
 
Introduction 
Moral judgments and the processes that underlay moral decisions and the 
evaluation of moral transgressions represent a highly debated topic for 
researchers from fields like psychology (Bartels 2009; Cushman Young and 
Hauser 2006; Greene et al. 2008) or philosophy (Foot 1967). In the area of 
moral decisions (Bartels et al. 2015), and moral judgments, special 
attention has been paid to biasing factors that are those aspects that 
influence moral judgments despite the fact that they are not relevant or 
should matter very little (Baron 2013).  
                                                                        
1 This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources 
Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian 
Government under the contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133675. 
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Initially, the term ‘moral bias’ has been defined in relation to moral 
decisions when someone chooses the deontological option over the 
utilitarian one in moral dilemmas (Sunstein 2005). This definition was 
soon regarded as too restrictive, because even if people did not choose the 
option that implied the smallest amount of harm, their choice cannot be 
classified as wrong, as both choices can be justified in relation to a moral 
principle. The recent definitions of moral bias are broader and refer to a 
sum of factors that weigh in on moral judgments, although they should not 
(Baron 1994, 2013). In other words, a biased moral judgment is an 
evaluation of an agent’s actions that is influenced by some irrelevant 
aspects of the moral scenario, such as the words chosen to describe it (the 
framing effect, Sinott-Armstrong 2008) or the order of presentation of 
moral dilemmas (Feldman at al. 1976; Petrinovich, L. 1996). Previous 
studies have investigated various factors that bias peoples’ moral 
judgments. The most important biases are: the consequence bias (Baron 
and Hershey 1988), the omission bias (Baron and Ritov 1994), the framing 
effect (Sinott-Armstrong 2008), and the actor-observer bias (Nadelhoffer 
and Feltz, 2008). The consequence bias refers to the fact that people tend 
to evaluate moral transgressions depending on their consequences: if the 
consequences are severe, the action is seen as being more immoral, even if 
the agent’s intentions and behavior are identical in both stories (Baron & 
Hershey 1988; Berg-Cross 1975; Lipshitz 1989; Mitchell and Kalb, 1981). 
The framing effect refers to the fact that, when evaluating moral 
transgressions, people are influenced by details of the scenarios, like the 
font with which they are written (Laham et al. 2009), the order of 
presentation, if there are more scenarios (Petrinovich 1996) and the 
phrasing of the scenarios. For example, using the word save versus kill 
determines participants to choose more often the utilitarian response, even 
though the consequences of the dilemma are identical (Sinott-Armstrong 
2008). Another bias that has been extensively studied is the omission bias: 
people have the tendency to consider omissions as less morally wrong than 
actions, even if both action and omission have the same consequences and 
the agent’s intentions are the same – for example, killing a person by 
poisoning is considered to be more blame-worthy than killing a person by 
withholding the antidote (Baron and Ritov 1994; Anderson 2003). The 
actor-observer bias refers to the tendency to apply different moral 
standards to others than we would apply for ourselves in the same 
situations; actions that are permissible for us were considered immoral if 
done by others (Nadelhoffer and Feltz 2008). Moral judgments are also 
influenced by personal reasons. The self-interest bias describes peoples’ 
tendency to make less severe evaluations when they have something to 
gain (Bocian and Worciszke 2014). 
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The high number of studies in the area of moral biases and moral 
heuristics and the vast interest this topic receives is explained, among 
other factors, by a strong relation between biased patterns of thinking and 
real-life issues, like the legislative system. An example of a situation where 
current practices make people to evaluate transgressions in a biased way is 
the legal system, which fosters the tendency to judge situations according 
to the consequences of a transgression and not the severity of the 
transgression itself. According to the law, the gravity of a crime is 
established primarily depending on its consequences, and the same 
criterion applies for establishing the punishment (Kadish Schulhofer and 
Steiker, 2007). On the other hand, peoples’ tendency to consider inactions 
as being less immoral than actions (the omission bias) is highly relevant for 
the real-life dilemma about euthanasia: while passive euthanasia (the 
withholding of standard medical treatment that results in a patient’s death) 
is eventually tolerated, active euthanasia and assisted suicide (which 
involves more action) are forbidden in most countries (Baron 2013).  
To summarize, people’s judgments of moral transgressions seem to 
be influenced by the way the transgression is presented (the framing 
effect), the person who violates the moral rule (actor-observer bias), the 
characteristics of the moral transgression (the omission bias), its outcome 
(the consequences bias), and by motivational reasons (self-interest bias). 
Another factor that could bias moral judgment is related to the way in 
which people make attributions of responsibility.  
The defensive attribution theory describes the way in which people 
explain accidents and attribute responsibility for them either to external, 
random causes like chance, or to the person who caused them. The results 
of the original research (Walster 1966) show that the attribution of 
responsibility to the person who unintentionally caused an accident 
increases with the severity of the consequences. The same attribution 
pattern was observed in the case of victims of accidents or acts of violence; 
the more severe the accident, the more responsibility was attributed to the 
victim (Coates, Wortman, and Abbey 1979). In other words, the 
participants found it hard to believe that accidents with severe 
consequences could be determined by fate or bad luck and they tried to 
identify someone who should bear the responsibility for the bad outcome. 
There are several theoretical frameworks that tried to explain the 
defensive attribution tendency: the most common and widely mentioned is 
the motivational theory (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Walster 1966), but there 
are also alternative explanations, like the belief in a just world theory 
(Lerner and Miller 1978), the accident occurrence probability (Brewer 
1977), or the legal system and practices (Kadish Schulhofer and Steiker 
2007). 
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The theoretical framework that seems to best explain defensive 
attribution is based on motivational and self-protective reasons 
(Robbennolt 2000), when they assign responsibility to either the victim or 
the actor (and not to uncontrollable factors, like fate), the participants 
might express the wish to reduce the probability that a similar accident 
could also happen to them (Walster 1966). Another key element of the 
motivational theory is related to the predictability of future negative 
incidents: by assigning responsibility to predictable factors, the incident 
itself becomes more predictable and thus avoidable (Fiske and Taylor 
1991).  
The belief in a just world hypothesis, another possible explanation, 
states that people share the need to believe that the world in which we live 
in is a just world, and that, basically, everybody gets what they deserve 
(Lerner and Miller 1978). Based on this belief, if something bad happens, 
the victim must be held responsible for it because, at least to an extent, 
he/she deserved it; the reversed principle also applies: if someone causes 
an accident with severe consequences, he/she must be held responsible for 
them, because the idea that bad things randomly happen contradicts the 
belief in a just world.  
Tennen and Affleck (1991) also note that the tendency to make 
defensive attributions increases not only with the severity of the 
consequences, but also with the unusualness and peculiarity of the 
situation. They explain this result by saying that these unusual 
characteristics of the situation entail a higher need of explaining them. 
Finchman and Jaspars (1983) propose an alternative explanation based on 
the participants’ estimations whether other people would have acted in a 
similar manner as the actor who caused the accident. Participants tend to 
attribute less responsibility to the agent who caused an accident if they 
consider that most people would have acted in a manner similar to the 
agent. If, on the other hand, participants appreciate that the agent acted in 
a very specific and distinctive way, different from what most people would 
have done then more responsibility is attributed to him/her. 
The legal system and practices also encourage and explain this type 
of attributions. The need to find the person responsible for a crime and to 
punish them accordingly increases with the severity of the consequences. 
From a legal point of view, the degree of damage is relevant in establishing 
the punishment and the damage compensation (Kadish Schulhofer and 
Steiker 2007). The need for justice is another psychological factor that 
explains the tendency to attribute more responsibility and to punish more 
severely the actors who cause accidents with severe consequences. By 
punishing them more severely, there is a sense that justice has been done 
and that the victim was somewhat compensated for the injustice that 
he/she has suffered (Galanter and Luban 1993, Carther et al. 1996).  
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Another alternative explanation is related to the probability of 
occurrence. Accidents with mild consequences occur more frequently, so 
the responsibility attributed to the actor would be lower; on the other 
hand, accidents with severe consequences occur less frequently, so it 
seems that the actor bears more responsibility for being involved in an 
accident with low probability of occurrence (Brewer 1977).  
Nevertheless, after the study that first described the tendency to 
make defensive attributions (Walster 1966), the subsequent studies found 
contradictory and inconsistent evidence on the effect: in some studies, the 
increased severity of the consequences lead to the attribution of less 
responsibility (Shaver 1970, study 3), and in some cases, there was no 
statistical difference between the participants from the severe 
consequence condition and those from the less severe consequence 
condition (Walster 1967; Shaver 1970, study 1; Thomas and Parpal 1987).   
These inconsistent results have been explained by the influence of 
some mediating variables, which were not taken into account in most of the 
previous studies, such as perpetrator culpability, self-protective 
motivations, and perpetrator characteristics (Nisbett and Ross 1980). For 
example, Shaver (1970) found that, when the participants perceive 
themselves similar to the agent, the effect seems to be reversed: they tend 
to attribute less responsibility to the agent when the consequences of the 
accident are severe. The perceived similarity determines people to 
empathize with the agent (Campbell 2002), and increased empathy makes 
the assigning of blame and responsibility more uncomfortable (Regan and 
Totten 1975; Gould and Sigall 1977). Also, when participants perceive 
themselves similar to the agent, specific motivational mechanisms are 
activated, such as harm avoidance (Shaver 1970). The increased similarity 
with the agent determines participants to consider that there is a high 
probability to find themselves in a similar situation in the future. Assigning 
less blame allows them to symbolically avoid future blame.  
Based on the idea that increased similarity with the agent causes the 
participants to empathize more with him/her, a fact that triggers 
motivational processes like harm avoidance, we hypothesize that the same 
psychological mechanisms will bias participants’ evaluations of moral 
transgressions. 
The aim of the present study is to extend the defensive attribution 
theory in the field of moral evaluation. We test whether the participants 
similar to the agent who transgressed a moral norm evaluate the 
transgression as being less immoral, as opposed to the participants who 
are not similar to the agent. 
 




Fifty-seven undergraduates (7 men) from the University “Alexandru Ioan 
Cuza”, Iași, the Faculty of Psychology and Social Sciences, aged 20 to 23 (M 
= 21, SD = 0.58) took part in our research in exchange of extra course 
credit.  
Design, materials and procedure  
The participants were assigned to one of two conditions: low versus high 
similarity. In each condition, the participants read a scenario which 
described a driver who illegally overtook another car and, as a result, hit a 
pedestrian who was taken to the hospital with a broken leg. The scenario 
was created in a similar manner to the stories previously used by Baron 
and Hershey (1988). 
The personal similarity was manipulated by the description of the 
driver, in terms of age (21 versus 69), profession (student versus retired), 
gender (the same or different as the participant), and the place he/she was 
driving to (to college or to the market place). In order to ensure the success 
of the similarity manipulation all the participants from the high similarity 
group had a driver’s license (N = 31), while the participants from the low 
similarity group did not (N = 26). 
The participants from the high similarity group read the following 
story:  
Maria is 21 years old and she is a student. She is driving to college in her 
personal car. She is driving within the speed limit but, because she is in a 
hurry, she illegally overtakes another car and does not notice a 
pedestrian who is crossing the street. She brakes but still hits the 
pedestrian who is crossing the street. The pedestrian is taken to the 
hospital with a leg fracture. 
The participants from the low similarity group read the following 
story:  
Maria is 69 years old and she is retired. She is driving to the market place 
in her personal car. She is driving within the speed limit but, because she 
is in a hurry, she illegally overtakes another car and does not notice a 
pedestrian who is crossing the street. She brakes but still hits the 
pedestrian who is crossing the street. The pedestrian is taken to the 
hospital with a leg fracture. 
After reading the stories, the participants answered, on a 10 point 
scale, questions, about how immoral the action committed by the driver 
was and what punishment he/she should receive (a fine, jail time or both). 
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Results 
In order to determine whether the perceived similarity had an effect on the 
evaluation of immorality, we compared the high similarity group with the 
low similarity group. The results of the t test showed that the effect of the 
similarity on the moral evaluation was significant (t(55) = 2.75, p = 0.008); 
as expected, the participants from the high similarity group evaluated the 
actions of the driver as less immoral (M = 5.33, SD = 2.35) compared to the 
participants from the low similarity group, who evaluated the actions as 
being more immoral (M = 7.14, SD = 2.40).  
The similarity manipulation had no significant effect on the fine 
which the participants considered that the driver should pay (t(55) = 1.28, 
p = 0.207). The participants from the high-similarity condition appreciated 
that the driver should pay similar amounts of money as the participants 
from the low-similarity group.  
Also, there are no significant differences (t(55) = 0.71, p = 0.711) 
between the high and low similarity group with respect to the number of 
months the participants considered the agent should spend in jail. 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the influence of a new 
factor that could bias evaluations of morality in a specific context. We 
investigated whether an increased perceived similarity between the agent 
and the participant could lead the latter to make more permissive 
evaluations of the agent’s actions. We used a driving scenario, similar to the 
ones previously used by Baron and Hershey (1988), which described a 
driver who illegally overtook another car, hit a pedestrian crossing the 
street, and caused him/her a fracture. The driver was described as being 
either similar to the participant (same gender, age, and occupation) or 
dissimilar (different gender, age, and occupation).  
The results show that the participants were indeed influenced by the 
perceived similarity between them and the agent: an increased similarity 
caused them to make more permissive evaluations of the driver’s actions, 
even though the intentions and consequences were identical in both 
conditions. The same psychological factors that cause the participants to 
make defensive attributions – self-protective reasons (Robbennolt 2000), 
perceived probability (Tennen and Affleck 1991), and perception of others’ 
behaviors (Finchman and Jaspars 1983) – can also explain why the 
participants made biased evaluations of morality.  
It appears that the motivational theory (Fiske and Taylor 1991; 
Walster 1966) and the self-protective reasons (Robbennolt 2000), which 
explain the participants’ tendency to make defensive attributions, can also 
explain the biased evaluation of morality. The participants who were 
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similar to the driver anticipate that they could find themselves in a similar 
situation in the future. When considering the deed as less immoral, they 
symbolically protect themselves from future blame. In other words, the 
similar participants were more motivated to use harm avoidance strategies 
(Shaver 1970), because they feel that there is a high probability that they 
themselves might illegally overtake in the future. Considering the deed as 
less immoral helps them to reduce the guilt they might feel in a similar 
situation. 
Finchman and Jaspars’ (1983) observation that the attribution of 
responsibility is influenced by the degree in which the participants 
estimate that other people would have acted in a similar manner also 
explains our results: the participants from the high-similarity group had a 
driver’s license, which probably caused them to consider illegally 
overtaking as occurring more frequently than the participants from the low 
similarity condition, who did not have a driver’s license and were obviously 
less exposed to this type of behavior. The participants from the high 
similarity condition, who witness the illegal behavior more frequently, tend 
to consider it as a less severe transgression. The perception that this 
behavior is a normal practice that most people do, even if it is illegal, makes 
the behavior seem excusable.  
The previous explanation is also in accordance with Tennen and 
Afflecks’ (1991) observation that unusual and peculiar situations cause a 
higher need to explain them, which in turn leads to defensive attributions. 
Because they don’t have a driver’s license, the participants from the low 
similarity group are less familiarized with driving practices and violations. 
They have probably considered the agent’s behavior as more unusual, 
which in turn made them feel a higher need to explain it. One of the 
possible explanations is to attribute negative characteristics to the agent 
and to consider his/her behavior as wrong and immoral. 
The perceived similarity did not cause a difference in the fine the 
participants thought was appropriate for the agent, probably because, as 
previous studies have shown, the amount of punitive damages depends 
primarily on the legal system and on the amount of harm done (Kadish 
Schulhofer and Steiker 2007). 
In conclusion, the increased perceived similarity between the 
participants and the agent influences their moral evaluations, causing them 
to be more lenient. Increased perceived similarity seems to activate a 
desire to protect oneself from possible future blame: by excusing the 
driver, the participants from our study reduced the possibility to feel guilt 
in a similar situation. The participants from the high similarity condition 
had a driver’s license and they are thus more exposed to illegal overtakes 
from other drivers than the participants from the low similarity condition 
who did not have a driver’s license. The increased exposure to this 
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behavior caused them to consider the driver’s actions as less blameworthy 
because they are a rather common practice. 
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